WPCM  wHb.։ѽt%\6wc1 KCnL2/L}SLL#!DLD~jpgLT !9R C_."LlbO}sT9c"L~H6Q:h-19$B=ҏoS4@;ׂ}uZΛM%̋R _|UpªD\|e! P#Za=o1E]QuPZ }y]cC+ a7AA.bzRȮvml*}T] hFk! ֧ڑ0Qxz:iAb}9n}5|c[.+iB;z,%b`a]Q(\-${Jұ)_|裋UF")s), HBO#RU N %a 0(g^ w4 mb 0Al 0ADO!?N"vv!-%"R#%Kv&(**++,p .{.'10@2 0Np3 1u3,34 0c_5/5260#8MS9 01W9 0=9 09 0>: 0: 0; 0I< 0a< 0^= 0> 09> 0> 02? 0 @ 0: A 0CA 0_A 0 'B 0k1C 0D B*1F D3[F D+F 0F 0NH 065I 0kI 0:sJ 0hJ 0FKU6[KU>KU*KKLsMMU >NNkO.RSU BX"1XSYZ+[\<]_=`=a c c d dhhekkpxlxl]l4Enyoyorprprp5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q5q7qqqqqqqqqP+s({uuuukykykykykykykykykykykykykykykykyky 0{ 0B{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{`{j@~ 0U~ 0~ 0 0 0f 0 0҂ 0 0& 0DŽ 0 0] 0 0 0d 0 0 05 0Š 0 0R 0 0 0P 0 0 0 D/ D/ѐ 1eZeeՒՒ|}UNKΚΚ#''''JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ 72XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXHP LaserJet 8000 Series PCL 60(  Z6Times New Roman Regular($룂.L ;h..*׽Corel3|xU- -((3$ !      0  (#$  0     $    11    _ԀGeneralAccountingOffice,ChildSupportEnforcement:StatesExperiencewithPrivateAgencies  CollectionofSupportPayments,GAO/HEHS97112(Oct.1996);see,e.g.,PolicyStudies,Inc. t http://www.policy-studies.com/privatization/priv_full.htm.   $    20    _ԀLisa_Snell_Ԁ&AdrianMoore,EGovernment,IntellectualAmmunition:Privatization,  http://www.heartland.org/ia/novdec99/privatization.htm.  $    10    _ԀSee,e.g.,RobertMelia,http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/research/whitepapers/wp03full.cfm   $    7    _ԀSee,e.g.,RobertMelia,http://_www.pioneerinstitute.org_/research/_whitepapers_/wp03full.cfm.Muchofthis  reportingisdrivenbychildsupportmandates.PSILink,OneStopReporting:LinkingEmployerstoChildSupport t CustomerService,http://www.policystudies.com/products/elink.htm.  $    16    _Ԁhttp://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs11pub.htm.   $    33    _ԀEllenDannin,ToMarket,ToMarket:CaveatEmptorinToMarket,ToMarket:Reinventing  Indianapolis3,2226(SheilaS.Kennedy&IngridRitchie,eds.2001).  7 ' ejd0ejd .      $    34    _ԀCf.ReasonPublicPolicyInstitute(RPPI)Privatization2001:The15thAnnualReportonPrivatization  (2001)10,availableathttp://www.rppi.org. #  $    35    _ԀReasonPublicPolicyInstitute(_RPPI_)Privatization2001:The15thAnnualReportonPrivatization(2001)  10,availableathttp://www.rppi.org.   $    40    _ԀGaryWolf,WhoOwnstheLaw,Wired,May1994,  4 #O  5  http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.05/the.law.html,6#O   7 Ԁbutitlostthecase.DavidCayJohnston,WestPublishing t LosesaDecisiononCopyright,N.Y.Times,May21,1997,atD1; 8 http://www.cmcnyls.edu/Bulletins/WLLCRDC.HTM.XhX#XXhE#  $    48    _Ԁhttp://www.clasp.org/pubs/childrenforce/senfact.htm. A  $    52    _ԀMildredWarner&Amir_Hefetz_,PrivatizationandtheMarketRoleofLocalGovernment:SmallGrowth  inContractingUnderscoresDominanceofServiceProvisionbyPublicEmployees,EconomicPolicyInstitute t BriefingPaper(_n.d._),http://_www.cce.cornell.edu_/restructuring/doc/_pdf_/_marketstruct.pdf_   $    17    _ԀLisaSnell&AdrianMoore,EGovernment,IntellectualAmmunition:Privatization,  http://www.heartland.org/ia/novdec99/privatization.htm;JerryMechling&VictoriaSweeney,Findingandfunding t ITProjects,Part3:PerformanceContracting, 8 http://www.govtech.net/publications/gt/1998/mar/financing/financing.phtml   $    21    _ԀWilliam_Eggers_Ԁ&AdrianT.Moore,PrivatizingtheInformationHighway,  http://www.heartland.org/ia/febmar98/privatization.htm.   $    22    _ԀReasonPublicPolicyInstitute(_RPPI_)Privatization2001:The15thAnnualReportonPrivatization  (2001),availableathttp://www.rppi.org. !  $    12    _ԀGeneralAccountingOffice,ChildSupportEnforcement:EarlyResultsonComparabilityofPrivatized  andPublicOffices,GAO/_HEHS_Ԅ97414,27(Dec.1996).http://www.heartland.org/ia/febmar98/privatization.htm.   $    13    _ԀGeneralAccountingOffice,ChildSupportEnforcement:EarlyResultsonComparabilityofPrivatized  andPublicOffices,GAO/HEHS97415(Dec.1996).Thereportprovidesdetailsofvariouspartiespositionsasto t disclosureandtheimpactofcurrentandthencontemplatedlawonitsdisclosure.Id.at1516.TheIRSdenialof 8 v accesstocertaininformationdoesnotmeanthatithasnotbeenmadeavailablefromotherentitiesthatcollectsimilar  information.Id.at1416,35.   $    14    _ԀGeneralAccountingOffice,ChildSupportEnforcement:EarlyResultsonComparabilityofPrivatized  andPublicOffices,GAO/_HEHS_Ԅ97427(Dec.1996). &  $    23    _ԀReasonPublicPolicyInstitute(_RPPI_)Privatization2001:The15thAnnualReportonPrivatization(2001)  5,11,availableathttp://www.rppi.org.(O$3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a) "  $    24    _ԀReasonPublicPolicyInstitute(_RPPI_)Privatization2001:The15thAnnualReportonPrivatization(2001)  5,availableathttp://www.rppi.org.(;3$2#  0  .3  0   %  $    25    _ԀReasonPublicPolicyInstitute(_RPPI_)Privatization2001:The15thAnnualReportonPrivatization(2001)  5,7,availableathttp://www.rppi.org. (  $    26    _ԀReasonPublicPolicyInstitute(_RPPI_)Privatization2001:The15thAnnualReportonPrivatization(2001)  5,6,7,availableathttp://www.rppi.org. &  $    27    _ԀReasonPublicPolicyInstitute(_RPPI_)Privatization2001:The15thAnnualReportonPrivatization(2001)  8,11,availableathttp://www.rppi.org.0.Normal<:Definition T<GD:Definition L , ;1` hp x (#;  8.` hp x (#886Definition('z&H1      XXX(o&H2  XXX(o&H3  XXX(&H4 XXX XXX(o&H5  XXX(o&H6  XXX20Address8SP6Blockquote , , ;1` hp x (#;   8.` hp x (#8,*CITE,dl*CODEKI<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXSJ\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis6&)4Hyperlink            <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard KI<6X9`(Courier NewK XXXSJ\  `&Times New RomanS<:Preformatted/%  ,Kk (#/KI<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXSJ\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk (#/<:zBottom of =@( **=  B  ?K%2A`Arial?-A -  XXXSJ\  `&Times New RomanS&0 d d????'dxd'dxd<:zTop of For=@(**=  B  ?K%2A`Arial?-A -  XXXSJ\  `&Times New RomanS0Kl.SampleKI<6X9`(Courier NewKSJ\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterKI<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXSJ\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable:8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  <6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial  $    51    _ԀPSILink,OneStopReporting:LinkingEmployerstoChildSupportCustomerService,  http://www.policystudies.com/products/elink.htm. w  $    60    _Ԁ5U.S.C.A.552a(e)(1)(2000). x  $    59    _Ԁ5U.S.C.A.552a(e)(10)(2000).  $    61    _Ԁ5U.S.C.A.552a(_i_),(m)(2000).\  `&Times New Roman  $    63    _ԀRichardW.Stevenson,TheIncredibleShrinkingGovernment,BushStyle,N.Y.Times,Dec.8,2002,4,  at4. a  $    64    _ԀSee,e.g.,ToMarket,ToMarket:ReinventingIndianapolis(IngridRitchie&Sheila_Suess_  Kennedy,_eds_.2001);ElliottD._Sclar_,YouDontAlwaysGetWhatYouPayFor:TheEconomicsofPrivatization t (2000);Roland_Zullo_,PublicSectorUnionsandPrivatizationPolicy,6WorkingUSA9_(2002)._  $    62    _ԀRichardW.Stevenson,TheIncredibleShrinkingGovernment,BushStyle,N.Y.Times,Dec.8,2002,4,  at4.   $    2    _ԀDavidPittman,Suitseeksdamagesininformationtheft,TucsonCitizen(Jan.31,2003);DennisWagner,  LawsuitAccusesTriwestHealthcareofNegligence,ArizonaRepublic(Jan.30,2003);PersonalDataOfMilitary t Members,FamiliesStolen:ComputersStolenFromTriwestOffice;IdentityTheftFeared,TheDenverChannel.com 8 (Dec.26,2002),http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/;TomPhilpott,DataStolenOn550,000TriCare L BeneficiariesIn16States,MilitaryUpdate(Dec.25,2002),  http://www.fra.org/mil-up/milup-archive/12-25-02-milup.html.   $    39    _ԀTextofspeechdeliveredonFebruary15,1997,byWayneKelly,theSuperintendentofDocuments,tothe  FederalDocumentsTaskForceatALAPPXhXP#PXPXh##P#sMidwintermeetinginWashingtonDC.,12/13ProgressiveLibrarian t  (1997),http://www.libr.org/PL/12-13_Kelly.html. d   $    57    _ԀEllenDannin,ToMarket,ToMarket:CaveatEmptorinToMarket,ToMarket:Reinventing  Indianapolis3,4547(SheilaS.Kennedy&IngridRitchie,eds.2001).  $    4    _ԀDennisWagner,LawsuitAccusesTriwestHealthcareofNegligence,ArizonaRepublic(Jan.30,2003).   $    3    _ԀTomPhilpott,DataStolenOn550,000TriCareBeneficiariesIn16States,MilitaryUpdate(Dec.25,  2002),http://www.fra.org/mil-up/milup-archive/12-25-02-milup.html.   $    29    _ԀJerry_Mechling_Ԁ&VictoriaSweeney,FindingandfundingITProjects,Part3:PerformanceContracting,  _http_://_www.govtech.net_/publications/gt/1998/mar/financing/_financing.phtml_  $    47    _ԀToMarket,ToMarket:ReinventingIndianapolis(IngridRitchie&Sheila_Suess_ԀKennedy,_eds_.2001). 2  $    6    _ԀPaulMcDougall,Outsourcing'sOnInABigWay!_CIOs_ԀSeePromiseandProblemsinIncreased  Outsourcing,_InformationWeek_Ԁ(Mar.3,2003). y  $    5    _ԀJosephFarah,HomelandInsecurity:Areterroristsbehindriseinidentitytheft?Computer-basedcrime  wavesweepingU.S.couldbemajorrevenuesourceofenemy,WorldNetDaily(Jan.8,2003) t http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30347. 3  $    38    _ԀPaulMcDougall,Outsourcing'sOnInABigWay!_CIOs_ԀSeePromiseandProblemsinIncreased  Outsourcing,_InformationWeek_Ԁ(Mar.3,2003). 3  $    54    _ԀPaulMcDougall,Outsourcing'sOnInABigWay!_CIOs_ԀSeePromiseandProblemsinIncreased  Outsourcing,_InformationWeek_Ԁ(Mar.3,2003).  $    9    _ԀLisaSnell&AdrianMoore,EGovernment,IntellectualAmmunition:Privatization,  http://www.heartland.org/ia/novdec99/privatization.htm.   $    28    _ԀDarrellA._Fruth_,Note:EconomicandInstitutionalConstraintsonthePrivatizationofGovernment  InformationTechnologyServices,13_Harv_.J.Law&_Tec_Ԁ521,52122(2000);William_Eggers_Ԁ&AdrianT.Moore, t PrivatizingtheInformationHighway,4h #O  5  http://www.heartland.org/ia/febmar98/privatization.htm.6#O    7 09ԀTheNationalCenter 8 forPolicyAnalysissuggeststhat ATMlikekioskscouldbeusedtoletpeopleusetheircreditcardstopayparking L tickets,getinformationonpropertytaxes,orpreparedivorcepapers.http://www.ncpa.org/pd/govern/oct97a1.html.   $    30    _ԀWilliam_Eggers_Ԁ&AdrianT.Moore,PrivatizingtheInformationHighway,  4 #O  5  http://www.heartland.org/ia/febmar98/privatization.htm.6#O   7 ?;seealsoDarrellA._Fruth_,Note:Economicand t InstitutionalConstraintsonthePrivatizationofGovernmentInformationTechnologyServices,13_Harv_.J.Law& 8 _Tec_Ԁ521,528(2000). [  $    18    _ԀLockheedMartinAwarded$102MillionContracttoSupportDefenseCivilianPersonnelManagement  Service,PRNewswire,June18,2002;PublicSectorTrends,Privatization1(2001),availableat t http://www.rpi.org.http://www.heartland.org/ia/febmar98/privatization.htm. S  $    8    _ԀPSILink,OneStopReporting:LinkingEmployerstoChildSupportCustomerService,http://www.policy  _studies.com_/products/_elink.htm_;http://NEnewhire.com/faqs/index.html. *  $    15    _Ԁhttp://www.clasp.org/pubs/childrenforce/senfact.htm;seealsoPrivatizationThreatThwartedonCapitol  Hill(Oct.2000),http://www.afscme.org/publications/leader/2000/00090108.htm.  $    45    _ԀPSILink,OneStopReporting:LinkingEmployerstoChildSupportCustomerService,  http://www.policystudies.com/products/elink.htm.  $    44    _ԀCf.PublicSectorTrends,Privatization5(2001),availableathttp://www.rpi.org.  $    46    _ԀRonaldC.Moe,ExploringtheLimitsofPrivatization,47Pub.Admin.Rev.453,458(1987). -  $    58    _ԀGeneralAccountingOffice,ContractManagement:ImprovingServicesAcquisitions(Statementof  WilliamT.Woods,ActingDirectorAcquisitionandSourcingManagement),GAO02179T1(Nov.1,2001). Pittman,TheDenverChannel.comPhilpottTriWestFarahWorldNetDaily RPPISnell4www.pioneerinstitute.orgwhitepapers HEHSMechling"www.govtech.net"financing.phtmlNewswireThinkSpark SDRtech_features<www.washingtontechnology.comFruth Harv Tec eds   $    55    _ԀPaul_Annee_,Policingthe21stCenturyCity,inToMarket,ToMarket:ReinventingIndianapolis159,  16970(IngridRitchie&Sheila_Suess_ԀKennedy,eds.2001);HaroldW._Demone_,Jr.,ThePoliticalFutureof t Privatization,inIThePrivatizationofHumanServices:PolicyandPracticeIssues205,206(Margaret_Gibelman_Ԁ& 8 HaroldW._Demone_,Jr.,eds.1998);seealsoLamontJ._Hulse_,TargetingNeighborhoods,inToMarket,ToMarket: L  ReinventingIndianapolis175,190(IngridRitchie&Sheila_Suess_ԀKennedy,eds.2001).   $    53    _ԀSeeHaroldW._Demone_,Jr.,ThePoliticalFutureofPrivatization,inIThePrivatizationofHuman  Services:PolicyandPracticeIssues205,22830(Margaret_Gibelman_Ԁ&HaroldW._Demone_,Jr.,eds.1998).<$$:footnote tex  XXX  <:footnote ref V  $    31    _ԀEdwardMcKenna,OutsourcingEffortsGatherSteamAmongFederalAgencies:StatesTownsProgress  DespiteOneDead,WashingtonTechnology,Mar.20,2000 t http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/14_24/tech_features/1153-2.html.Thegovernorthenprivatizedparts 8 ofthestatesITsystem.WilliamWelsh,ConnecticutsRowlandPushesITModernization,June4,2001, L http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/16_5/state/16643-1.htmlhttp://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.05/the.law.html*+ (_2623  ..*G+G (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ../%` ` hp x /   *8+8 (_24  ," hp x ,23  ..," hp x ,  *5+5 (_23 ` ) hp x )23  ..) hp x ) ` *2+2 (_22  &hhp x &23  ..&hhp x &  */+/ (_21  #p x #23  ..#p x #  *,+, (_20 h  p x 23  .. p x h *)+) (_19  pp x 23  ..pp x   *&+& (_18   x 23  .. x   *AA (_17  5+ ` hp x 523  Ԁ5+ ` hp x 5  *GG (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ/%` ` hp x /   *88 (_15  ," hp x ,23  Ԁ," hp x ,  *55 (_14 ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ) hp x ) ` *22 (_13  &hhp x &23  Ԁ&hhp x &  *// (_12  #p x #23  Ԁ#p x #  *,, (_11 h  p x 23  Ԁ p x h *)) (_10  pp x 23  Ԁpp x   (&& &_9   x 23  Ԁ x   (AA &_8  5+ ` hp x 523  5+ ` hp x 5  (GG &_7   /%` ` hp x /23  /%` ` hp x /   (88 &_6  ," hp x ,23  ," hp x ,  (55 &_5 ` ) hp x )23  ) hp x ) ` (22 &_4  &hhp x &23  &hhp x &  (// &_3  #p x #23  #p x #  (,, &_2 h  p x 23   p x h ()) &_1  pp x 23  pp x   &&& $_   x 23   x   ?)1dxd?)2dxd 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. P  $    19    _Ԁ_ThinkSpark_ԀSigns$6.8MillionAgreementwithLockheedMartinforDepartmentofDefenseCivilian  PersonnelSystem,BusinessWire,July16,2002;seealsohttp://www.cpol.army.mil/modern/.     $    32    _ԀDarrellA.Fruth,Note:EconomicandInstitutionalConstraintsonthePrivatizationofGovernment  InformationTechnologyServices,13Harv.J.Law&Tec521,52224(2000.   $    41    _ԀTextofspeechdeliveredonFebruary15,1997,byWayneKelly,theSuperintendentofDocuments,tothe  FederalDocumentsTaskForceatALAPPXhXP#PXPXh##P#sMidwintermeetinginWashingtonDC.,12/13ProgressiveLibrarian t (1997),http://www.libr.org/PL/12-13_Kelly.html. |  $    49    _ԀCf.DarrellA._Fruth_,Note:EconomicandInstitutionalConstraintsonthePrivatizationofGovernment  InformationTechnologyServices,13_Harv_.J.Law&_Tec_Ԁ521,533(2000). r  $    50    _ԀDarrellA._Fruth_,Note:EconomicandInstitutionalConstraintsonthePrivatizationofGovernment  InformationTechnologyServices,13_Harv_.J.Law&_Tec_Ԁ521,534(2000). s  $    1    _ԀProfessorofLaw,WayneStateUniversityLawSchool.B.A.UniversityofMichigan;J.D.Universityof  Michigan.##ԀThispaperwaswrittenwiththeassistanceofagrantfromtheEconomicPolicyInstitute.'O Z 6Times New Roman Regular A  $    42    _ԀMildredWarner&Amir_Hefetz_,PrivatizationandtheMarketRoleofLocalGovernment:SmallGrowth  inContractingUnderscoresDominanceofServiceProvisionbyPublicEmployees,EconomicPolicyInstitute t BriefingPaper(_n.d._),http://_www.cce.cornell.edu_/restructuring/doc/_pdf_/_marketstruct.pdf_   $    37    _ԀTextofspeechdeliveredonFebruary15,1997,byWayneKelly,theSuperintendentofDocuments,tothe  FederalDocumentsTaskForceatALAPPXhXP#PXPXh##P#sMidwintermeetinginWashingtonDC.,12/13ProgressiveLibrarian t (1997),http://www.libr.org/PL/12-13_Kelly.html.   $    56    _ԀWilliamWelsh,ConnecticutsRowlandPushesITModernization,June4,2001,  http://_www.washingtontechnology.com_/news/16_5/state/16643-1.html   $    36    _ԀTextofspeechdeliveredonFebruary15,1997,byWayneKelly,theSuperintendentofDocuments,tothe  FederalDocumentsTaskForceatALAPPXhXP#PXPXh##P#sMidwintermeetinginWashingtonDC.,12/13ProgressiveLibrarian t (1997),http://www.libr.org/PL/12-13_Kelly.html.$i)  $    43    _ԀCf.PublicSectorTrends,Privatization5(2001),availableathttp://www.rpi.org. !  _   8dd8XhXOY PrivatizingInformationandInformationTechnology  !WhoseLifeisitAnyway?   +  EllenDannin  #  1       t ?   Abstract  L    Federalagenciesplanto_outsource_Ԁ33%oftheirinformationtechnologyprojectsin2003. $ t Inaddition,muchofthemanagementandcollectionofpersonaldatabystateandfederal  ` governmentagencieshasbeenoutsourced.  L    Recenteventshavedemonstratedthatthisinformationhasenormousvalue,economically  8  andpolitically.Identitytheftisontherise,andinformationcollectedandretainedbythe $  governmentcanbeusedtoperpetratethiscrime.Inaddition,otherinformation!homeaddresses   andphonenumbers,spousesnames,childrensnames,schools,andsocialsecuritynumbers,   emailaddresses,informationaboutpastemploymentandeducation,healthrecordsand   disciplinaryactionswholelivesandtheirintimatedetailsaremaintainedbythegovernment.     Aterroristwouldrejoiceinsuchgreatfortune.Thisinformationcouldbeusedfor p nefariouspurposessuchasidentitythefttosupportterroristprojects.Evenmoreworryingisthe \ possibilityforblackmailtogainaccesstoandcontrolovergovernmentemployees.The H December2002theftofharddrivesfromTriWest,acontractorprovidinghealthcareservicesfor 4 themilitary,hasleftoverhalfamillionservicemenandwomenandtheirfamiliesvulnerableand  p ournationalsecuritybreached.  \   AlsoinDecember2002,itwasfoundthat_Ptech_,asoftwaredeveloperforcriticalfederal H agencies,wasfundedbyindividualswithterroristconnections. 4   Onceoutofthegovernmentssolecontrol,opportunitiesforaccessmultiply.Information   cananddoesmakeitswayaroundtheworldwiththespeedoflight.Everytimeinformationis   transferredthereisanopportunitytodivertit.And,giventhenatureofinformationinelectronic  form,diversionmaybehardtodetect.    Despitewhatwehavelearnedrecentlyabouthowcriticalinformationtechnologyis,how  easilyitcanbemisused!andhowexpensivethatmisusecanbe!bothfederalandstate l governmentsarepursuingacourseofprivatizinginformationthatseemstoknownobounds. X  Privatecompaniesnowhavecontractstoprovideawiderangeofservicesthatinvolvegenerating D! andcollectinghighlypersonalinformation,includingsocialandmentalhealthservices; 0"  education,medicationandpsychiatricservices;unemploymentbenefitsprocessing;accounting #l! andinformationtechnology;legalservices;permitapplication,paymentoftaxesorfines,andcar $X" registration.Addtothese,contractsthatrelatemoredirectlytoITservices.TheTreasury $D # Departmenthascontractedoutits informationtechnologyservices,includingnetworks,LANs, %0!$ desktopcomputersetups,helpdesksupport,andsystemadministration.Pennsylvania &"% announcedthatitwouldconsolidateand_outsource_Ԁallitsagenciesdatacenters.Connecticutsaid '#& itwantedtoturnoverallitsITfunctionstotheprivatesector,becauseinformationtechnology (#' wasnotseenasacoregovernmentfunction.    Thistransferofimportantfunctionsfrompublictoprivatecontrolshouldbeatthecenter  ofnationaldebate.Itaffectsournationalsecurity,ourpersonalsecurity,andourfinances.Yet  therehasbeendeafeningsilence!exceptforthosewhocheerleadeverymovementfrompublic t toprivatecontrol.Thetimehascomefornationaldebateonthisissue. `    I.Introduction  8      OnDecember14,2002,someonebrokeintotheofficesofTriWestHealthcareAlliance  ` andstoleallitscomputerharddrivescontaininginformationon562,000membersofthemilitary  L  locatedinArizona,Colorado,Idaho,Iowa,Kansas,Minnesota,Missouri,Montana,Nebraska,  8  Nevada,NewMexico,NorthDakota,SouthDakota,Utah,WyomingandwesternTexas.The $  informationcontainednames,addresses,phonenumbers,SocialSecuritynumbers,claimsdata,   birthdates,dutystations,medicalrecords,creditcardnumbers,andotherinformationonactive   dutymilitarypersonnelandtheirdependentsandretireesenrolledinTriCarethroughTriWest   HealthcareAllianceCorporation,amanagedcaresupportcontractor.T  #  2      ׀     Itispossiblethethiefwassimplylookingforaneasytarget.TriWestsofficesinPhoenix p weresoinsecurethatelectronicdoorrecordsshowthethiefmadetwotripsintoandoutofthe \ area.Thethievesidentityremainsunknown,inpartbecausetheofficewasnotevenprotectedby H surveillancecameras.Y(  #  3      ׀ 4   Butwhileitisnaturaltothinkofthisonlyintermsofidentitytheftandthehavocthis  p wouldcausethosewhoseinformationhasbeenstolen,itispossiblethemotivesmayhavebeen  \ morenefarious.Itislikelythatmanyofthemilitarybeneficiarieswerepreparingtobedeployed H totheMiddleEastinpreparationforthewaronIraq.Someonewhowantedtoseekrevengeon 4 thoseinvolvedandpotentiallyweakentheresolveofthemilitaryinaninvasioncoulduse   informationtolocatespousesandchildrenandkidnapthemorterrorizeandthenkillthem.Xx  #  4      ׀So   farnothingsoterriblehashappened.Indeed,somesuggestthatidentitytheftmaybeusedina  morebenignwaysimplytofinanceterrorism.]   #  5      ׀    AlthoughtheTriWesttheftmaybeaworstcasescenarioforcontractingoutinformation  gatheringandITtechnology,itisnotunique.Federalagenciesplantooutsource33%oftheir  informationtechnologyprojectsin2003.\  #  6      ׀Recentlythefederalgovernmentsubcontractedthe  DefenseCivilianPersonnelDataSystem,whichisessentiallythehumanresourcesdepartment  foritscivilianemployees.Thatsubcontractorimmediatelyresubcontractedpartoftheworkto t yetanotherfirm. `   Again,whatatreasuretroveofinformation!homeaddressesandphonenumbers, L  spousesnames,childrensnames,schools,andsocialsecuritynumbers,emailaddresses, 8  informationaboutpastemploymentandeducation,healthrecordsanddisciplinaryactions $ t wholelivesandtheirintimatedetailslaidoutfortheluckypersongivenaccesstoit.  `   Aterroristoracriminalwouldrejoiceinsuchgreatfortune.Thisinformationcouldbe  L  usedfornefariouspurposessuchasidentitytheft!somethingthatcouldnettheperpetrator  8  millionsofdollarstofundthethiefsprojects.Evenmoreworryingisthepossibilityfor $  blackmailtogainaccesstoandcontroloveremployeesinthiscriticaldepartment.     Maybeterroristsandcriminalsdontthinkthisway.Orperhapstheydo.Andiftheydo,   thegovernmentneedstogetseriousaboutprotectingthevaluable!andpotentiallydangerous!   informationitcollectsabouteachofus.     Onceoutofthegovernmentssolecontrol,opportunitiesforaccessmultiply.Information p cananddoesmakeitswayaroundtheworldwiththespeedoflight.UScompaniesuseworkers \ incountriessuchasIndiaorIrelandtohandledata,becausetheyspeakEnglish,areeducated,and H willworkforafractionofthesalaryofUSworkers.Butthosecheapworkersmaycomeata 4 steepprice.Everytimeinformationistransferredthereisanopportunitytodivertit.And,given  p thenatureofinformationinelectronicform,diversionmaybehardtodetect.  \   Despitewhatwehavelearnedrecentlyabouthowcriticalinformationtechnologyis,how H easilyitcanbemisused!andhowexpensivethatmisusecanbe!bothfederalandstate 4 governmentsarepursuingacourseofprivatizinginformationthatseemstoknownobounds.The   ReasonPublicPolicyInstitute(RPPI)reportsthatprivatecompaniesnowhavecontractsto   provideawiderangeofservicesthatinvolvegeneratingandcollectinghighlypersonal  information.Theseincludesocialandmentalhealthservices;education,medicationand  psychiatricservices;unemploymentbenefitsprocessing;accountingandinformationtechnology;  legalservices;permitapplication,paymentoftaxesorfines,andcarregistration.Addtothese, l contractsthatrelatemoredirectlytoITservices.Again,accordingtoRPPI,theTreasury X  Departmenthascontractedoutits informationtechnologyservices,includingnetworks,LANs, D! desktopcomputersetups,helpdesksupport,andsystemadministration.Pennsylvania 0"  announcedthatitwouldconsolidateandoutsourceallitsagenciesdatacenters.Connecticutsaid #l! itwantedtoturnoverallitsITfunctionstotheprivatesector,becauseinformationtechnology $X" wasnotseenasacoregovernmentfunction. $D #   Thistransferofimportantfunctionsfrompublictoprivatecontrolshouldbeatthecenter %0!$ ofnationaldebate.Itaffectsournationalsecurity,ourpersonalsecurity,andourfinances.Yet &"% therehasbeendeafeningsilence!exceptfromprivatizationideologueswhocheerleadevery '#& movementfrompublictoprivatecontrol.Butthetimehascomefornationaldebateonthisissue. (#' Ї   II.ContractingoutInformationGatheringandInformationTechnology   .  Gotohttp://www.maximus.com/public/virtual/government/childsupport.Clickonthe  link,andyouwillbeattheNebraskawebpage!http://www.nenewhire.com/.Assumeyouarean t employerwhobylawmustnowreportdetailedinformationforeverynewlyhiredemployee, ` includingemployeesocialsecuritynumber,incomewithholding,andmedicalinsurance L  verification.  #  7      ׀Today,chancesareyouwillmeetthisbyfillingouttheformonlinethroughyour 8  stateswebpage.Everythingaboutthewebpagewillmakeitappearthatyouaredealingwiththe $ t government,but,infact,behindthescenes,youareprobablyprovidingthisprivateinformation  ` toasubcontractor.j  #  8        L    OrifyouwanttoregisteryourvehicleonlineinArizona,youwillactuallybedealing  8  withIBM,who operatestheprogramonitsownservers,inexchangefor$1pertransactionand $  2percentofrevenues.`,  #  9           Orassumeyouareaparentwithachildsupportorderagainstyou.Childsupport   enforcementwilllocatethefather,establishpaternity,andcollectchildsupport.|  #  10      ׀Butnowthe   enforcersarelikelytobeprivatecontractors!bountyhunters!sentouttocollectchildsupport   payments.   #  11      ׀Theprivateagencywillbegivenaccesstopersonalinformationfromgovernment p databasestobeusedintrackingyoudownandgainingcompliance.Thismayincludedrivers \ licensedataandtaxreturninformation,includingsocialsecuritynumbers,homeaddresses, H sourcesofearnedincome,includingemployeraddress,andsourcesofunearnedincome,suchas 4 bankaccountsormutualfunds.   #  12      ׀Foranexampleofthissortofwebsite,seeIowasreporting  p pagesathttp://206.247.251.6/epics_dev/static/resource.htm.NebraskaandTennesseehavegiven  \ contractorsevengreateraccesstotaxinformationthantheIRSpermittedunderlawsintendedto H protectconfidentialinformation. l  #  13      ׀Onceasupportorderexists,theagencymonitors,recordsand 4 distributespaymentsandcanenforcedelinquentpaymentsthroughanarrayofcollection  methods.!  #  14      ׀    Opponentsofwhattheycall bountyhunterproposalsobjecttomakingsuchawide  rangeofinformationavailabletoprivatecollectionagencieswhocancontractwithcustodial t parentstocollectunpaidchildsupport.TheCenterforLawandSocialPolicy(CLASP)argues ` thatfederalandstatedatabasesthatsomewanttomakeavailableinclude confidentialfinancial, L  employment,andmedicalinsurancedataobtainedfromtheInternalRevenueService,financial 8  institutions,employers,interstatelawenforcementnetworks,correctionssystems,unemployment $ t compensationprograms,andmanyotherpublicandprivatedatasources.kh  #  15        `   ThePrivacyRightsClearinghousenotes: Virtuallyeverymajorchangeinlifeisrecorded  L  somewhereinagovernmentdocument.Shortlyafteryouareborn,abirthcertificateisissued;if  8  youobtainadriverslicense,getmarried,buyahouse,filealawsuit!alloftheseeventsare $  recordedinpublicdocumentseasilyavailabletoyouandtoothers.  #  16           Therangeofprivateinvolvementwithinformationcollection,acquisition,andretention   isbreathtaking.Itreachesintoeveryareaofgovernmentandthelivesofthepublic.Asmore   governmentservicesaredeliveredthroughonlinetransactions,moreofthemwillbeprovidedto   somedegreebyprivatecontractors._D   #  17      _ԀForexample,in2002,LockheedMartinwona$102 p millioncontracttocontrolhumanresourcesforciviliansworkingforthemilitary,theDefense \ CivilianPersonnelDataSystem.f   #  18      ׀LockheedMartin,inturn,subcontractedpartoftheworkto H ThinkSpark.0  #  19      ׀SDRTechnologiesdevelopssoftwareforgovernmentandrunsitonitsown 4 serversatnochargetotheagency.Itiscompensatedonapertransactionbasis.  #  20      ׀In1997,  p Pennsylvaniaannouncedthatitwouldconsolidateandoutsourceallitsagenciesdatacenters.  #  21        TheReasonPublicPolicyInstitutereportonprivatizationduring2000providesexamplesofthe  widerangeofinformationcollectionanddataretentionthatareinvolvedinsubcontracting,  #  22        includingsocialandmentalhealthservices,suchaseducation,medicationandpsychiatric t services;"h  #  23      ׀processingofunemploymentbenefits;%  #  24      ׀accountingandinformationtechnology;'   #  25       ` legalservices;(X   #  26      ׀permitapplication,paymentoftaxesorfines,andcarregistration.)  #  27      ׀ L    Ratherthanconsideringwhetherthismassivemovefrompublictoprivatecontroliswise, 8  governmentseesitsinformationtechnologysystemsasespeciallyappropriateforprivatization.b  #  28       $ t Why?Onereasonisthatgovernmenthasfailedtodevelopsufficientinhouseexpertise.Asa  ` result,governmentnowhasnochoicebuttoturntoprivatecompaniesforexpertiseinthis  L  rapidlydevelopingarea.Inaddition,equipmentandsoftwarecostsarehigh,Z  #  29      ׀andkeepingup  8  withconstantchangeintechnologyhasbeenseenastoodifficult. $    Asecondreasonisthatsomeingovernmentbelieveitshould divestitselfofthose   functionsthatarenotseenascoregovernmentfunctions!amanagementphilosophyrecently   popularintheprivatesector.Informationisafunctionthatcanbecategorizedasanoncore   function!andthusonetobecontractedout.In1999,Connecticut,forexample,announcedit    wantedtoturnoverallitsITfunctionstotheprivatesector,becauseinformationtechnologywas p notseenasacoregovernmentfunction.d  #  30      ׀Intheend,itchosenottodoso,butmanyotherstate   andlocalgovernmentshave._  #  31      _    Well,sowhatifwhatoncewasgovernmentinformationisbeingsubcontracted?Doesit  matterwherethisfunctionislodgedintheprivateorpublicsector?Sofarcheerleadingfor t privatizationhasbeenallthathasbeenheard.Buttherearepotentiallydisastrousconsequences ` fornationalsecurity,personalsecurity,andeconomicsecurityifthisunasked,unexplored L  questionisansweredwrong. 8    Furthermore,thedimensionsoftheproblem!andtheimportanceofgettingitright! $ t increaseeveryday.Asgovernmentsincreasinglyemployinformationtechnology,theyaredoing  ` morethanjustprovidingtraditionalservicesmorequicklyandatlowercost.Theyarealso  L  restructuringtheformofgovernment._<   #  32      _ԀThisrestructuringhasmanypositiveaspects,for  8  example,makingitpossibletocheckforinformationorperformothertransactionsonlinerather $  thaninline.But,ontheotherhand,thosewholackeasyaccesstocomputerswillbeincreasingly   marginalizedandshutoutfromtheirgovernment.Inaddition,iftheentityperformingthese   informationservicesisnotreallythegovernment,theyareatanevergreaterremoveand   probablyhavelessaccessandabilitytocallthegovernmenttoaccount.     Answeringthequestionwhetheritmakesadifferencethattheentitywithaccesstoand p controlofinformationisprivateratherthanpublicultimatelyrequiresconsideringwhether \ governmentdiffersfromprivate.Fortunately,whileweasanationmustconfrontthatquestionat H somepoint,wecanassessmanykeyissuesaboutprivatizingpublicinformationcollectionand 4 retentionintheabsenceofananswertoissuesofaccountabilityandgovernance.  p   Asafirststep,weneedtoask:Whatisspecialaboutinformation,ifanything.  \   Thesecondquestion,alsoripeforexploration,iswhetherinformationinprivaterather H thanpublichandsislikelytocreatespecialproblems.Thisthenleadstothethirdquestion: 4 whethertherearewaystopreventorremedyanyproblemsthatarise.      A.IsInformationSpecial?   \  Inasense,informationissimplyaformofproperty.Privatesubcontractorsareoften  given,leased,lent,orsoldgovernmentpropertytoallowthemtoperformthejob.Thesecan l includebuildings,vehicles,orotherspecializedequipment.Ortheymayacquirepropertywhile X  performingthejob.Examplesmayberevenuegenerated,suchasparkingfeescollected;property  builtoracquired,suchasbusesorbuildings;orimprovements.  #  33      ׀Publicinformationcanalsobe  giventoacontractortoenableittodoajob.Oritcanbeacquiredasthejobisperformed.Or  acquiringinformationmaybetheobjectofthecontract. t   Butitisjustasplainthatinformationismorethansimplyanotherformofproperty. ` Informationhasuniquequalitiesthatmakeitespeciallyvaluableandhighlymarketable.Whereas L  abushasalimitednumberofuses,mostofwhichareeasilyforeseen,theusesofinformationare 8  onlylimitedbytheimaginationoftheonewithaccessto,orpossessionof,theinformation. $ t Perhapsmostimportant,andunlikephysicalproperty,informationisalmostinfinitelyreplicable.  ` Itcanbereturnedtothegovernmentattheendofacontractandsoldonthemarketandalso  L  retainedbythesubcontractor.Informationisthusmorelikealifeformthanlikerealproperty.  8  Withinformationnowinelectronicform,thisqualityhasbeenenhanced. $    Accesstoanduseofinformationishighlydependentonthemediumwithinwhichit   exists.Thus,whenacontractorcontractsfortheuseofitscomputerequipmenttoperformajob   andespeciallywhenitdesigns!andowns!thesoftware,itisinauniqueandpowerfulposition   withregardtoaccesstotheusesofthatpropertyandtheinformationretainedontheharddrive.  #  34         Asaresult,agovernmentagencymayfindthat,evenifitisdissatisfiedwiththecontractors p performanceandhastherighttoterminatethecontract,terminationwillbesocostlythatitis \ virtuallyimpossibletodoso.Therewillbealargesunkcostinthedevelopmentofthesoftware, H andthegovernmentmaynotwanttofacehavingtodevelopnewsoftwareifitmovestoanew 4 vendor.Thesoftwareitselfmayaffectwhetherandhowthedatacanberetrievedorusedwith  p othersoftware.Assumingthedatacanbeexportedfromitssoftwareenvironment,itmightstill  \ benecessarytoreenterallthedata.Itcanbeveryexpensiveanddisruptivetoterminatethissort H ofcontract.Therewillbecoststoretrainemployeeswhoworkwiththedataandlosttimeand 4 efficiencyduringthetrainingperiodandchangeover.Dependingonthecontractslanguage,the   contractormightclaimthatitownsthedata,notthegovernment.Inshort,thegovernmentagency   thatentersintothesecontractsmaylackeffectivemeanstodisciplinethecontractorandenforce  itsrights.Andifthegovernmentcannotdothesethings,itcannotprotectthepublicsinterests,  includingthepublicsinformation.    AccordingtoRPPI,theTreasuryDepartmentcontractedoutits informationtechnology l services,includingnetworks,LANs,desktopcomputersetups,helpdesksupport,andsystem X  administration.h  #  35      ׀Onewondersexactlyhowmuchthoughtthegovernmentgavetothe D! consequencesofthisdegreeofoutsidecontroloverandaccesstovaluableprivateinformation. 0"  Didtheyconsideronlythecostofthecontractandwhetheritwascheaper?Didtheyenumerate #l! andthencostouttheconsequencesoffailurebythevendor?Certainly,ifproblemsarise,there $X" maybeahighpricetopayforwhatseemtobelowercostITservices.    Wealreadyhavestoriesofunforseennegativeconsequencesfrommovingvaluable  informationfrompublictoprivatecontrol.Forexample,Thestoryofwhathappenedtothe  JournaloftheNationalCancerInstituteprovidesanexampleofwhatcanbelostwhen t informationpaidforatgovernmentexpensemovesfrompublictoprivatehands.Originally,the ` JournalwasprintedthroughtheGovernmentPrintingOffice.By1992,thesemimonthlyJournal L  wasselling6,240copiesatanannualsubscriptionof$51,wasdistributedfreetomorethan800 8  depositorylibraries,andwasrecognizedforpublishingthebestoriginalresearchpapersin $ t oncologyfromaroundtheworld.In1993,theNationalCancerInstituteinstitutedaprogramthat  ` madeaccesstotheJournaltwiceasexpensive.Forthis,theInternationalCancerInformation  L  Center,publisheroftheJournal,receivedaFederal"Hammer"award.InJanuary1997,itwas  8  privatized.OwnershipwastransferredfromtheNationalCancerInstitutetoOxfordUniversity $  Press.NofreecopieswouldbeprovidedtoDepositoryLibraries,andsubscriptionpricesroseto   $120foranindividualand$150foraninstitution.  #  36           Theresultisatighteningupoftheflowofscientificinformation.Thechangemadeit   moreexpensiveanddifficulttodisseminateinformationthatcanmakeadifferenceinlifeor   death.Italsomeansthataresourceandinfrastructuredevelopedwithextensivepublicfunding p nowexiststoenrichaninstitutionandnottobenefitthepublic.WayneKelly,theSuperintendent \ ofDocumentsfortheGovernmentPrintingOfficeraisedadditionalimportantquestionsaboutthe H change: LookingthroughthePXhXXXhJournal#XhXXPXhw#,anumberofquestionscometomind.Inotethatthe 4 mastheadlistssome26staffmembers.Iwonderiftheeditorialandnewsstaffisstillbeingpaid  p bytheAmericantaxpayer,butworkingfortheOxfordUniversityPress?IwonderiftheOxford  \ Pressissharingrevenuesfromthenew,highersubscriptionratewiththeNationalCancer H Institute?Iwonderifcopyrightwillpreventalibrarianfromsendingacopyofanarticleto 4 anotherlibrarian?Headded: Ihavenowayofknowingtheanswerstothesequestions,because   thedetailsoftheCooperativeResearchandDevelopmentAgreementarenotpublicinformation,   accordingtoNCIlegalcounsel.   #  37          Inrecountingthisstory,WayneKellyaskedfundamentalquestionsin1997thathaveyet  toenterthepublicdebate.Perhaps,withstoriesaboutsalesofprivatefinancialinformation,  _Ptech_Ԁanditspotentiallinksto_terrorism,^@  #  38      _Ԁandoverayearofcorporatescandals,thetimehas l cometotakeanotherlookatthem: X  0   ` ButwhatifthisnewtrenddrivesfutureFederalGovernmentInformationPolicy? 0"  Sincethefoundingofournation,thecornerstoneofinformationpolicyintheUnited  StateshasbeentheprincipleofuniversalaccesstoFederalinformation.Thisprincipleis  beingsetasidewithoutmanyoftheusualchecksandbalancesinourdemocraticsociety:  Withoutanyhighlevelpolicydebate,withoutclearrules,withoutthoughttounintended t consequences,andoftenwithoutfullpublicdisclosureofthenegotiationsand ` agreements.L (#(# 0   ` IsallFederalinformationwithsufficientdemandgoingtobesenttomarket?Ifso, 8  weshouldthinkaboutwhatthatmeans.$ t(#(# 0   ` DoesitmeanthataGovernmentagencymaysellitsnameaswellasits  ` information? L (#(# 0   ` Doesitmeanthatawidearrayofprivatesectorpublisherswillnolongerhave  8  accesstotheinformationtoaddvalueandredistributeittomanydifferentmarketsin $  differentproducts? (#(# 0   ` Doesitmeanthepublicconsumermustpaytwoorthreetimesasmuch,ormore,   forthesameinformation? (#(# 0   ` Doesitmeanthatagencypublisherswillfocustheirattentiononmorepopular,   marketableinformationandeliminateother,perhapsmoresignificantbutlessmarketable p information?\(#(# 0   ` DoesitmeanthatprogramsauthorizedbyCongresswillbegintomoveawayfrom H publicneeds,tofocusinsteadonmarketneedsnevercontemplatedbyourelected 4 representatives? p(#(# 0   ` DoesitmeanGovernmentemployeesworkingattaxpayerexpensetosupportthe  \ informationrequirementsofprivatefirms?Andisn'tthatcorporatewelfare?H(#(# 0   ` AndwhatiftheJournaloftheNationalCancerInstitute,nowownedbythe 4 OxfordUniversityPress,doesnotmeettheprofitgoalsofthenewowner?Doesitmean   thatinsteadofa"Hammer"award,therewillbethe"axe"usuallyawardedsubpar   performersinthemarketplace?(#(# 0   ` WhorepresentsthepublicinaBottomlineInformationEra?(#(# 0   ` Whatistopreventournation'sbridgetothe21stCenturyfromturningintoatoll  bridgeforGovernmentinformation?U  #  39      ׀l(#(#   Thereareevenmorestoriesthatcanbeadded.TherewastheWestPublishingcase.West D! publishesawiderangeoflegalmaterials,includingvolumesoflegalcasesandstatutesfornearly 0"  everyjurisdictionintheUnitedStates.Atonepoint,Westclaimeditownedthegovernmental #l! materialsithadpublished,notjustcopyrightintheformatinwhichitpresentedthem.  #  40      ׀These $X" casesandstatuteswereprovidedtoWest!andtoanyotherpublisher!freeandattaxpayer  expense.Eventuallyalegalcaseresolvedtheissueofownership.  #  41      ׀Butlawsuitsarecostlyeven  forthewinner.WhowillbethenextentrepreneurwhoattemptswhatWestdid!ownershipin  thepublicsinformation?Ownershipmeanstherighttoexcludeothersandtherighttoprofit t fromspecificproperty.Wehaveseenadebateaboutclaimedownershipingeneticinformation. ` Wemayyetseethedaywhensomeoneclaimsownershipinourpersonalinformationjust L  becauseitwasinagovernmentdatabasetransferredtoaprivatecontractor. 8    Asmentionedbefore,informationdiffersfromotherformsofpropertyinthatitismore $ t likealifeform,becauseitcanreplicate!oratleastitcanbecopied.Oncethismeantscribes,  ` thentypists,andlaterphotocopying.Nowinformationisinformsthatmeananinfinitenumber  L  oforiginalscanbecreatedinseconds.Aprivatecontractorattheendofitscontracttermcould  8  potentiallyreturnalldatainitspossessiontothegovernmentwhilealsosecretlyretainingthe $  samedata.Acontractorcouldreleaseorsellordistortdatainwaysnotpreviouslypossible.You   cannotdothissortofthingwithbussesorfeespaidforaccesstonationalparks.Toprovidethe   assurancethatnoneofthisinformationhasbeenretainedwillrequiretechnologicalsolutions   beyondmereinventoriesorbalancesheets.     Fewrealizethatasmanygovernmentfunctionsarecontractedoutasarecontractedback p in.AsmoreinformationandITservicesarecontractedout,  #  42      ׀wewillfacemoreandmore \ informationthatwecannotbecertainhasleftthehandsofthosenotlegallyentitledtopossessit. H   Again,althoughaformofproperty,informationisspecial.Thedamagethatcanbedone 4 byaprivatecontractorinpossessionofabusownedbythepublicislimited.Butmisused  p informationhasenormouspotentialtoharmpeopleandgovernment.Clientsofpublicmental  \ healthserviceswouldwantinformationtheyprovidetoremainconfidential.N  #  43      ׀Thesameis H probablytrueofthosewhoseekHIVtesting,regardlessofthetestresults.Althoughnot 4 necessarilyconfidential,informationacquiredwhileperformingpublicagencyaccounting   functionsisalsolikelytogeneratevaluableinformationneedingcarefulhandling.n  #  44      ׀Addtothis   thereleaseofpersonnelinformation(homeaddress,dependents,orbenefitsusage)connected  withthoseprovidingnationalsecurity.Thepotentialforharmisenormous.    Insum,then,whileinformationmayberegardedasjustanotherfunction!andnotacore  oneatthat!orasjustaformofproperty,thisisfartoocavalierawaytotreatit.Itcombinesthe l qualitiesofbeinghighlyvaluable,potentiallydamagingifreleased,easilyreplicable,andbeing X  difficulttotraceifwronglyreleased.Addtothatthefactthatthecurrentadministrationandstate D! governmentsarebentonprivatizingITandsofarhaveproventobeunconcernedaboutour 0"  OY     welfare.     B.AreThereSpecialProblemsthatMightAriseConcerningSubcontractedInformation?     Contractorswhohaveaccesstoorstoreconfidentialinformationdorealizethattheyneed ` togiveconfidentialinformationahighdegreeofsecurity.l  #  45      ׀Wecanassumethatmostwill L  performtheirjobsethicallyandasintended.Butinordertoavertproblemsandplandefenses, 8  youhavetolookatworstcasescenarios!notthegoodguys.Oratleastrememberthattheguys $ t weoncethoughtwerethegoodguysnowhaveofficersdoing perpwalks.Giventhe  ` importanceofinformationandtheenormousharmthatcanflowfromitsmisuse,itamountsto  L  criminalmisfeasancetoassumethebest,eventhoughthebestmayoccurmostofthetime.Are  8  thereplausiblescenariosthatmightleadtoamisuseofinformation? $    Youwouldhavehadtohavebeentotallyisolatedfromthenewsthepasttwoyearsnotto   comeupwithhighlylikelyscenarios.Wecanconcludethatterroristattacks,fearsofsuch   attacks,financialwrongdoing,salesofpersonalfinancialdatawillhappen,becauseweknow   theyhavehappened.Whilefutureeventsmaynotbeexactrepetitions,thisrecentpastpointsout   thepathsweneedtobelookingalong. p   Financialexigencyiscertainlylikelytopressacontractor!oracontractorsemployees! \ tomisuseinformation.Weareinthemidstofeconomicdownturn,andthereisalotoffinancial H exigencygoingaround.Acontractorthatfindsitselfinfinancialstraitsorevenacontractorwith 4 alowlevelofethicsandastrongdesiretomaximizeitsprofitmayfinditdifficulttoforgothe  p temptationtomakeuseofthevaluablecommoditythatprivateinformationis.In1987,Ronald  \ Moeobserved: Thestakesforprivatepartiesareoftenhigh,andtheymaybewillingtogotothe H edgeofthelaw.Thusthepotentialforcorruptionduringthecontractstageofthedeliveryprocess 4 isconsiderable.q  #  46      ׀RecentcasestudiespublishedbyIngridRitchieandSheila_Suess_ԀKennedyin   ToMarket,ToMarket:ReinventingIndianapolis[  #  47      ׀demonstratejusthowcommoncorruptioncan   be,especiallywhenanadministrationisblindedbyproprivatizationideology!andjusthow  greatlythiscanharmthepublicwelfare.    Recentexperiencewiththeunethicalorevenillegallengthstowhichevenlarge  companieswillgotogenerateprofitscoupledwiththeproblemsmanyhaveexperiencedwith l identitytheftsuggestthatproblemsinthisareaarelikely.Informationprovidedonthegrounds X  thatgovernmentkeepitconfidentialwillcreateadangeroussituation.Whileinformationcanbe D! transferredorsharedthesedayswithgreatease,itisdevilishlydifficulttomonitorandprevent 0"  itswrongfuldisseminationandthentoremedyitsmisuse.0  #  48      ׀ConsiderNebraskaswebpagefor #l! employerreportingonnewhires.Anemployermightnotrealizeitwasprovidinginformationto $X" Maximus(althoughthisinformationisavailableifonehappenstoclickthecorrectlink.)The  employeewhoseinformationhasbeenprovided!butwhowillbeunawareofthemediumused  toprovideit!andwhoistheonelikelytosufferharmisparticularlyvulnerable.Theemployee  mightrealizeherprivateinformationhasgottenintothehandsofwrongdoerswhenthecredit t cardbillsarrive,butisunlikelytobeabletotracehowthatprivateinformationwasreleasedand ` thustoseekrecourse. L    Isgovernmentanybetteratkeepingsecrets?Wecanallthinkofleakedinformation.And 8  weallknowthatsomegovernmentemployeeshavebeencorrupt,buttheverynatureof $ t governmentasanonmarketinstitutionmeansthatitdoesnotfacethefinancialpressuresas  ` privateentities.Simplyput,governmentagencieshavelessincentivetobehaveopportunistically  L  inthewaysthatmightleadtothemisuseofprivateinformation.  #  49      ׀Privatizationproponentsargue  8  thatmarketforcesresultingfromcompetitionpromotelowercostandhigherqualitythanis $  possibleinthepublicsector,whichisshieldedfromthemarket.Ifthemarketandcompetition   arethatpowerfulinpromotingpositiveends,weneedtorememberexperiencesthatdemonstrate   thatmarketforcescanleadtodeceptionandcorruptionandenormousharm.     Inotherwords,whentheinformationunderconsiderationhasamarketvalueitmayneed   tobeprotectedfromtheconsequencesofmarketforces.Thissuggeststhatinmakingthe p decisionwhethertocontract,thegovernmentoughttoconsiderwhetherthisisasituationin \ whichitoughttooptforstabilityandlackofmarketcompetition.Butifthisisthecase,then, H contractingoutisnotappropriate.Wealsohavetobeconcernedaboutthenationalsecurityvalue 4 ofsomeinformation.Suchinformationwouldattractbuyerswhohaveshowntheyhavevery  p deeppockets.Again,theharmsufferedwouldnotwarrantevenlargesavings.  \   Whatisparticularlyworryingisthatthegovernmenthascrippleditselfsothatitnow H lackstheabilitytoprotectus.Ifitistruethatprivatecontractorshavegreaterincentivesto 4 misuseinformation,thengovernmentmustexerciseevengreateroversightoverprivate   contractors.  #  50      ׀Thiswillincreasethecostsofcontractingout.Butifareasonforcontractingout   informationservicesisthatgovernmentlacksexpertise,thenhowisgovernmenttoexerciseany  effectiveoversight?     C.ThinkingaboutWaystoProtectInformationfromAbuse  l >  Obviously,theexecutivebranchshouldbethinkingmorecarefullyandlessideologically D! aboutprivatization.Justasobviouslyitisunlikelytodoso.Thatleavesthelegislaturetotakeon 0"  thisrole.GiventhecurrentpoliticalmakeupofCongress,hearingsonthisissueareunlikely, #l! becauseiftheywereopenandhonesttheymightshowthat p foolproofprotectionsfordataand $X" informationsystemsaredifficultorimpossibletodevise,thatdividingresponsibilitybetweenthe $D # publicandprivatesectorshasthepotentialtocreatenewdangers,thattheproblemisserious,that %0!$ informationishighlyvaluableandpersonal,thatmisuseofdataandinformationsystemscan &"% wreakhavoc,andthatthereareseriousconsequencesifitfallsintothewronghands!andthat,  therefore,itshouldnotbesubcontracted.    ButifCongressweretodotherightthingandimmediatelyholdhearingsonprotecting  informationandinformationtechnologywithoutapredeterminedend,whatissuesshouldthose t hearingsinclude? `   First,itisnotenoughtobringonaparadeofgoodguys.Itiscertainlytruethat L  contractorswhohaveaccesstoorstoreconfidentialinformationdorealizetheyneedtogive 8  confidentialinformationahighdegreeofsecurity.L  #  51      ׀Inaddition,somemaybeboundbycodesof $ t professionalconduct.However,youcannotmakepublicpolicybasedonlyontheconscientious  ` andcompetent.  L    Sinceasmanygovernmentfunctionsasarecontractedoutarecontractedbackineach  8  year,  #  52      ׀wehavetoplanforcontractterminationanditsconsequences.Atabareminimum,the $  contractmustincludethetermsuponwhichtheservicewillbeterminated.Inthecaseof   information,thismeanscreatingandrequiringafullyeffectivemethodfordeterminingthatall   copiesofinformationhavebeenreturned.Amongthosetermsmustbeagreementasto   ownershipofdata.Itishardtoimagineanyreasonwhythosetermsshouldgiveownershiptothe   contractor.Butitmaybethatthecontractorwillassumeitgetsownershipandbasethecontract p priceonthatassumption.Inthatcase,thegovernmentmayhavetopayfortherighttoretainthat \ ownership.Innocase,shouldtheissueofownershipsimplybeassumed. H   Notonlyisthereaneedtoprovideforhowinformationwillbetreatedattheendofa 4 contract,but,giventhehighdegreeofsensitivityinvolvedwithinformationhandlingand  p retention,theremustbecontinuingoversightinordertoprotectinformationandtoassess  \ whetherthecontractorisperformingproperly._,  #  53      _ԀInordertoexerciseoversight,tomaintainfull H controlofpolicyandmanagement,governmentmustretainandupgradethenecessary 4 expertise.__|  #  54      _     Theproblemisthatrecentmanagerialdecisionshavedestroyedthiscapacity.For   example,whentheGoldsmithadministrationprivatizeditsInformationServicesAgency,itwas  leftsodebilitatedintermsofpersonnelandfiscally,ithadtroublefunctioning._   #  55      _ԀWhen  Connecticutstateemployeeschargedthatthegovernorrefusedtoprovidepromisedtrainingto  upgradestateemployeesITskills,thegovernorsofficerespondedthattheemployeescould  havebetterpayingjobsintheprivatesector._ T  #  56      _    StarvingpublicITfunctionsisaprecursortoprivatization.Oneimportantreasoncitedfor t contractingoutITisgovernmentslackofuptodateexpertise.W  #  57      ׀ButifthereisinadequateIT ` capacityinhouse,thencontractingoutisnotasalvationrather,itisverydangerous.Studyafter L  studyhasshownthatoversightiscriticaltoholdingprivatizationaccountability,butalsothatitis 8  theweakestpartofsubcontracting.  #  58      ׀Ifthatistruewheregovernmenthasahighdegreeof $ t expertise,thenwearelikelytoseeseriousproblemsarisingfromalackofadequateoversightof  ` informationtechnology.Furthermore,itwillbeimpossibletohidethisweaknessfromthe  L  contractoranditsemployees,whowillknowtheyhaveafreehand.  8    Congress!andwe!mustrethinkwhetherconceivingofgovernmentinthemoldof $  privatesectororganizationisaccurateandappropriate.Underthatmodel,asuccessfulbusiness   focusesonitscorefunctionsand_outsources_Ԁallothers.Itisthismodelthatsaysinformation   collectionandretentionisaprivatesectorfunctionandisnotpartofagovernmentagencys   function.Butthismodelfailstotakeintoaccountagovernmentsrelationshiptothosewhoelect   ittogovernthem.Privatizationexcludesthepublicfrominputintodecisionsthataffect p individualsandthepublicwelfare.Italsofailstoaccountforthedireconsequencesthatmay \ befallinformationonceitisoutofthegovernmentssolecontrol.Allthissuggeststhatitistime H forgovernmenttoupgradeandretainITskillsandtotreatretentionandcollectionofinformation 4 asacoregovernmentfunction.Italsomeansthatbackgroundchecksneedtobeperformedonall  p employeeshandlinginformationandperformingITfunctions.  \   Congressalsoneedstoconsiderthatifwehaveallowedourinformationinfrastructure H andcapacitytodeterioratetothepointthattheonlysolutionisprivatization,wehavebeenleft 4 vulnerabletohostileattackbyhackersandevenmoremaliciouspeople.Logicallyspeaking,this   criticalgovernmentfunctionshouldnotbeallowedtodeterioratethroughneglect.Butthefailure   toproperlyfundandstaffthiscriticalfunctionappearsalsotounderminetheintentofthePrivacy  Actof1974andeventoviolateitsspecificmandatethatagenciesareto establishappropriate  administrative,technicalandphysicalsafeguardstoinsurethesecurityandconfidentialityof  recordsandtoprotectagainstanyanticipatedthreatsorhazardstotheirsecurityorintegrity l whichcouldresultinsubstantialharm,embarrassment,inconvenience,orunfairnesstoany X  individualonwhominformationismaintained.ND   #  59       D!   Alongwiththatinquiry,Congresscanconsiderwhethermoreinformationiscollected  thanisneeded.Infact,governmentagenciesarealreadyrequiredtodothisunderthePrivacyAct  of1974.Itstates: Eachagencythatmaintainsasystemofrecordsshall!(1)maintaininits  recordsonlysuchinformationaboutanindividualasisrelevantandnecessarytoaccomplisha t purposeoftheagencyrequiredtobeaccomplishedbystatuteorbyExecutiveorderofthe ` President.M  #  60      ׀Congressshouldreassesswhetherthisrequirementhasbeencompliedwith. L    Whilethismightidentifysomeoverreaching,therealityisthatwhoelsebutthe 8  governmentshouldhavedatathatincludesoursocialsecuritynumbersorourhistoryofsocial $ t serviceusage.Governmentperformssuchawiderangeofservices,governmentasawholemust  ` collectandretainacorrespondinglywiderangeofdata.Partoftheinvestigationcanbeto  L  ascertainwhetherprivateuseofthisdatashouldbelimited.Thesocialsecuritynumberisthe  8  primaryproblem.Socialsecuritynumberswouldhavevirtuallynosignificancewereitnotfor $  theiroverusebyprivatebusinessesasuniversalidentifiers.Thisappropriationofthesocial   securitynumberforaprivatepurposehasmadeitpossibletobringtheeconomytoitsknees.   Imaginethelevelofsocialandeconomicchaosthatwouldensuewereonlyasmallpercentage   ofsocialsecuritynumberstobecompromised.Thoseindividualsandtheirfinancialinstitutions   wouldhavetofocusontheirindividualaccounts.Butthedamagewouldbefarbroader.Consider p thepanicthatfollowedthediscoveryofaverysmallamountofanthraxexposure.Many \ multiplesofthoseindividualswhoseidentitieswerestolenwouldbecheckingtheirfinancial H recordsforproblems.Allinstitutionsthatusesocialsecuritynumbersorwhodealwith 4 institutionsthatusesocialsecuritynumberswouldhavedeployworkerstodealwiththecrisis.  p Theeconomywouldcometoastandstill.  \   IfgovernmentistocontractoutinformationandIT,itneedstoidentifyandincludethe H fullcostsofharmfromtheirmisusewhenitcostsoutsubcontracting.Itmustalsobewillingto 4 payforprotectionsthatwillensuretothegreatestextentpossiblethatinformationisnotstolenor   misused.Thisshouldincluderequiringthatall_nongovernmental_Ԁandgovernmentalemployees   handlingpublicinformationholdhighlevelsecurityclearances.    Congressshouldalsoconsiderwhatcriminalandcivilsanctionswillbeadequateto  preventmisdeeds,anditmustdevelopandfundthemeanstotrackdownwrongdoers.Although  thePrivacyActof1974providescriminalpenaltiesthatapplytocontractors,theyarefartoo l limited.Theymakeitsviolationamisdemeanorandsubjecttoafinenogreaterthan$5000.OT  #  61       X  Thisishardlysufficientcomparedwiththegainstobemade!eitherbythoseseekingfinancial D! advantageorterroristends. 0"    Congressshouldconsidertheimportanceofbolstering_whistleblower_Ԁprotectionsasa #l! waytopreventwrongdoingormakeitmorelikelyperpetratorscanbebroughttojustice.Itis $X" alwaysdifficultforanemployeetoreportwrongdoing._Whistleblower_Ԁlawsaredesignedto $D # stiffenworkersbackbonessotheywillactinthepublicinterest.Ofcourse,providinggreater %0!$  protectionstofederalemployeesgoesagainstthePresidentsdesires,nowlawunderthe &"% HomelandSecurityAct,todecreasefederalemployeeprotections.S  #  62           TheExecutivebranchhasannouncedplanstoprivatize850,000federaljobs,nearlyhalf  thecivilianworkforce,inordertosavemoneyandimproveperformance.Q  #  63      ׀Thishasproblematic  implicationsformanybutespeciallyforsafeguardinginformationandnationalsecurity.But t whenonelooksbehindthesuperficialclaimsofproprivatizationideologuesandexamines ` carefulcasestudiesofprivatization,thereisscantifanyevidenceeitherofcostsavingsorgreater L  efficiency.Rh  #  64      ׀Infact,ensuringthatcontractoremployeesreceiveadequatepayandgoodworking 8  conditionsmaybenecessarytohelpremovetemptationstheunderpaidwouldhavetodivertand $ t sellinformation.Underthosecircumstances,theremaybenosavings.  `   Congresscanalsoenlistthepublicbyprovidingindividualswiththepracticalandlegal  L  meanstosuecontractorswhomisuseinformation.Theroleofprivatesubcontractorsin  8  collectinginformation,particularlywhentheirroleisdisguisedastheactsofthegovernment, $  raisesspecialproblems.Iftheinformationismisused,theprivateindividualmayfinditdifficult   toseekredress.First,sinceshewillbeunawarethatshedealtwithanyoneotherthanthestate,   shemayhavenowayoftrackinghowprivateinformationwasreleased.Theremaybeahigh   degreeoftrustinthegovernmentagencynottomisusethisinformation,atrustthatmightbe   lackingorlowerhadsheknownitwasaprivatesubcontractorwhowasacquiringand p maintainingtheinformation.Asaresult,somedegreeofdisclosure,bothtothepersonproviding \ theinformationandthepersonwhosepersonalinformationisprovided,mayberequired.Butthe H realityisthatevenifanindividualharmedbythereleaseofpersonalinformationcouldtrack 4 downtheperpetratorandsuethem,wouldtherebearemedyadequatetodealwiththeharm  p suffered.  \   Congressshouldalsobereadyforthepossibilitythatafairinvestigationofthesubject H wouldleadittoconcludethatpublicinformationandITfunctionsshouldnotbecontractedout. 4 Costsavingsmightdisappearifprivatecontractorswereheldtothehighestsecuritystandards.In   suchacase,itwouldbecheaperforthegovernmenttokeepITinhouse.     Evenmoreimportant,Congressmayseethatnomatterhowstiffthepenaltiesareorhow  certainjusticeis,thedangerthatourprivacymaybeviolatedonthechanceitmightsavethe  governmentsomemoneyissimplyarisknotworthnotworthtaking.